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Articles

WHY TOLERATE RELIGION?
Brian Leiter*

I. PRINCIPLED TOLERATION

Religious toleration has long been the paradigm of the liberal ideal of toleration of group differences, as reflected in both
the constitutions of the major Western democracies and in the
theoretical literature explaining and justifying these practices.
While the historical reasons for the special "pride of place" accorded religious toleration are familiar, 1 what is surprising is that
* Hines H. Baker & Thelma Kelley Baker Chair in Law. Professor of Philosophy.
and Director of the Law & Philosophy Program. The University of Texas at Austin. I am
grateful to John Gardner and Tony Honore for inviting me to present an early version of
some of this material to their "Jurisprudence and Political Philosophy" seminar at Oxford in December 2005. and to them and the students in the seminar for helpful comments. Law and philosophy students in my spring 2006 seminar on "Toleration" at the
University of Texas at Austin have helped me clarify my thoughts on this subject. An
earlier version of this essay was presented as the 'Or ·Emet Lecture at Osgoode Hall
School of Law of York University. Toronto in March 2006: later versions benefited from
comments at faculty workshops at the University of Chicago Law School. Chicago-Kent
College of Law. and the University of Minnesota Law School; from those who attended
the Keynote Address at the Graduate Conference sponsored by the Department of Philosophy at Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University; from an audience at Colgate
University who attended a public lecture sponsored by the Department of Philosophy;
and from the participants in the Kline Colloqium sponsored by the Department of Philosophy at the University of Missouri. Columbia. I should mention. in particular. helpful
conversations with or comments from Larry Alexander. Robert Audi. Curtis Bridgeman.
David Brink. John Deigh. Strefan Fauble. Naomi Gouldner. Leslie Green. Abner
Greene. Ross Harrison. Kenneth Himma. Paul Horwitz. Shelly Kagan. Brian Kierland.
Andrew Koppelman. Adrienne Martin. Martha Nussbaum. Michael Paulsen. Richard
Posner. Larry Sager. Adam Samaha. Steven Shiffrin. Sheila Sokolowski. David Strauss.
Cass Sunstein. Patrick Todd. and Mark van Roojen.
1. See. e.g .. Douglas Laycock on the American constitutional experience: "[I]n
history that was recent to the American Founders. governmental attempts to suppress
disapproved religious views had caused vast human suffering in Europe and in England
and similar suffering on a smaller scale in the colonies that became the United States ...
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no one has been able to articulate a credible principled argument
for tolerating religion qua religion: that is, an argument that
would explain why, as a matter of moral or other principle, we
ought to accord special legal and moral treatment to religious
practices. There are, to be sure, principled arguments for why
the state ought to tolerate a plethora of private choices, commitments, and practices of its citizenry, but none of these single
out religion for anything like the special treatment it is accorded
in, for example, American and Canadian constitutionallaw. 2 So
why tolerate religion? Not because of anything that has to do
with it being religion as such- or so I shall argue.
To see why this is so we will need to start with some distinctions that make possible a more perspicuous formulation of the
question. In particular, we need to state clearly what is at stake
in something called a "principle of toleration." I shall take as a
point of departure a useful formulation of the issues by the late
English philosopher Bernard Williams:
A practice of toleration means only that one group as a matter of fact puts up with the existence of the other, differing,
group .... One possible basis of such an attitude ... is a virtue
of toleration, which emphasizes the moral good involved in
putting up with beliefs one finds offensive .... If there is to be
a question of toleration, it is necessary that there should be
some belief or practice or way of life that one group thinks
(however fanatically or unreasonably) wrong, mistaken, or
undesirable.'

For there to be a practice of toleration, one group must deem
another differing group's beliefs or practices "wrong, mistaken,
or undesirable" and yet "put up" with them nonetheless. That
means that toleration is not at issue in cases where one group is
simply indifferent to another. I do not "tolerate" my neighbors
who are non-White or who are gay, because I am indifferent as

Douglas Laycock. Religious Liberty as Liberty. 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 313. 317
(1996).
2. The Canadian Charter does. at least. recognize in the text liberty of ··conscience:· along with religious liberty. but in practice. the protection for religious conscience turns out to be stronger. Some U.S. Supreme Court cases. involving constitutional challenges to the Universal Military Training and Service Act. have moved in the
direction (at least for "conscientious objectors·· to military service) of expanding the
meaning of "religion·· to encompass broader ccmmitments of conscience. See esp .. Welsh
v. United States. 398 U.S. 333 (1970). Even here. this was framed as a matter of statutory
interpretation. not constitutional principle.
3. Bernard Williams. Toleration: An Impossible Virtue?. in TOLERATION: AN
ELUSIVE VIRTUE 18.19 (David Heyd ed .. 1996).
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to the race or sexual orientation of those in my community.
"Toleration," as an ideal. can only matter when one group actively concerns itself with what the other is doing. believing. or
"being." Obviously, in many cases, the attitude of "indifference"
is actually morally preferable to that of "toleration": better that
people should be indifferent as to their neighbors' sexual orientation than that they should disapprove of it, but "tolerate" it
nonetheless.
But a practice of toleration is one thing, a principled reason
for toleration another. Many practices of toleration are not
grounded in the view that there are moral reasons to tolerate differing points of view and practices, that permitting such views
and practices to flourishes is itself a kind of good or moral right,
notwithstanding our disapproval. Much that has the appearance
of principled toleration is nothing more than pragmatic or, we
might say, "Hobbesian" compromise: one group would gladly
stamp out the others' beliefs and practices, but has reconciled itself to the practical reality that they can't get away with it, at
least not without the intolerable cost of the proverbial ''war of
all against all." To an outsider, this may look like tolerationone group seems to "put up'' with the other- but it does not
embody what Williams called a "virtue" of tolerance (or what I
will call "principled" tolerance), since the reasons for putting up
are purely instrumental and egoistic, according no weight to
moral considerations. One group "puts up" with the other only
because it wouldn't be in that group's interest to incur the costs
required to eradicate the other group's beliefs and practices.
But it is not only Hobbesians who mimic commitment to a
principle of toleration. On one reading of Locke,4 his central
non-sectarian argument for religious toleration is that the coercive mechanisms of the state are ill-suited to effect a real change
in belief about religious or other matters. Genuine beliefs, sincerely held, can't be inculcated at gunpoint, as it were, since they
respond to evidence and norms of rational justification, not
threats.' In consequence, says the Lockean, we had better get
used to toleration in practice-not because there is some princi4. Jeremy Walclron. Locke: Toleration and the Rationality of Persecution. in
JUSTIFYING TOLERATION: CONCEPTUAL AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES o] (Susan
Mendus ed .. 1988).
5. Locke puts a distinctively Protestant ··spin·· on this epistemological point. since
he believes that salvation can only come through a free (i.e .. uncoerced) embrace of religious doctrine. On that Protestant view. there would be no point in non-toleration. since
it would not accomplish any meaningful religious objective given the prerequisites for
salvation.
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pled or moral reason to permit the heretics to flourish, but because the state lacks the right tools to cure them of their heresy,
to inculcate in them the so-called "correct" beliefs.
Locke, it is fair to say, did not fully appreciate the extent to
which states and-in capitalist societies-private entities can
employ sophisticated means to effectively coerce belief, means
that are both more subtle and more effective than he imagined.
That history offers up so many examples of societies in which the
tyranny of the few over the many is accepted by the many as a
quite desirable state of affairs is compelling evidence that states
can successfully inculcate beliefs, even dangerously false beliefs.
Locke's "instrumental" argument for a practice of toleration
should provide little comfort to the defender of toleration given
Locke's (understandable) failure to appreciate the full complexity of the psychology and sociology of belief inculcation.
Not only Hobbesians and Lockeans, however, mimic principled toleration. A variation on the Lockean instrumental argument for toleration is apparent in a popular theme in American
political thinking-one that receives a well-known articulation in
Frederick Schauer's defense of free speech" -according to which
government can't be trusted to discharge the task of intolerance
"correctly," that is, in the right instances. Speech can harm, in all
kinds of way, notes Schauer, and the various rationales for putting up with these harms-from John Stuart Mill's "marketplace
of ideas" to Alexander Meiklejohn's conception of free speech
as essential to democratic self-government-almost all fall prey
to objections of one kind or another. But, says Schauer, there is
still a reason to demand that the state "tolerate" many different
kinds of speech (even harmful speech), and that is because there
is no reason to think the state will make the right choices about
which speech ought to be regulated. Schauer calls this "the ar7
gument from governmental incompetence," and says,
Freedom of speech is based in large part on a distrust of the
ability of government to make the necessary distinctions, a
distrust of governmental determinations of truth and falsity,
an appreciation of the fallibility of political leaders, and a

6. FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY (1982). See
also JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 73-92 (Elizabeth Rappaport. ed .. Hackett 1978)
for similar considerations.
7. SCHAUER, supra note 6. at 86.
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somewhat deeper distrust of governmental power in a more
8
general sense.

It is not, then, as in the Lockean argument, that government
lacks the right means for bringing about intolerant ends, it is
rather that government is not competent, that is, can not be relied upon, to deploy its means in the right cases. Perhaps this
kind of instrumental argument for state toleration is more plausible, but its justificatory structure makes it no different from
that of the Lockean's: it doesn't tell us why we, morally, ought
not to crush differing beliefs or practices, it tells us only that we
(through the instrumentality of the state) are unlikely to do it
right.
Where a genuine "principle of toleration" gets its purchase
is in the cases where one group (call it the "dominant" group)
actively disapproves of what another group (call it the "disfavored" group) believes or does; where that dominant group has
the means at its disposal to effectively and reliably change or end
the disfavored group's beliefs or practices; and yet still the
dominant group acknowledges that there are moral or epistemic
reasons (that is, reasons pertaining to knowledge or truth) to
permit the disfavored group to keep on believing and doing what
9
it does. That is pure or "principled" toleration, and the question,
then, is whether there is such a reason to tolerate religion.
My concern here shall mainly be with the principled
grounds of state toleration, as opposed to toleration in interpersonal relations, though the issues are often similar. But for purposes of the argument, I shall confine my attention to the principled reasons why the state should refrain from a distribution of
benefits and burdens that has as its intended consequence the
disfavoring of religion or of particular religions. I frame the
problem in these terms because, even though the historical problem about religious toleration was generated by conflict among
religious groups, the contemporary problem, at least in the postEnlightenment, secular nations (of which the United States may
still be one) is different: it is why the state should tolerate religion as such at all.

8. /d.
9. "Pure" or "principled" because the reasons for toleration are not based on selfinterest, at least not directly.
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II. PRINCIPLED ARGUMENTS FOR TOLERATION
Before we consider religious tolerance in particular. it will
be useful to consider the general structure of principled arguments for state toleration of group differences. The literature on
the subject is voluminous, so necessarily I will be able to consider only a few themes here. Yet the themes I emphasize will, I
believe, capture the main principled positions in the debates.
We can distinguish between two broad classes of principled
arguments for toleration, which I will call "moral" and "epistemic" (though the latter incorporates some moral considerations as well). The strictly moral arguments for toleration claim
either that there is a right to the liberty to hold the beliefs and
engage in the practices of which toleration is required; or that
toleration of those beliefs and practices is essential to the realization of moral goods. The moral arguments divide, predictably
enough, into Kantian and utilitarian forms. 10
As paradigmatic of the broadly Kantian arguments, consider the Rawlsian theory of justice according to which
·'[t]oleration .. .follows from the principle of equalliberty," 11 one
of the two fundamental principles of justice that, Rawls argues,
rational persons would choose in what he calls the "original position." The ''original position" is a situation in which people
choose the basic principles of justice to govern their societies,
and in which they do so deprived of the kind of information
about their place in society that would render their judgments
partial and self-serving. As Rawls puts it:
[T)he parties must choose principles that secure the integrity
of their religious and moral freedom. They do not know, of
course, what their religious or moral convictions are, or what
is the particular content of their moral or religious obligations
as they interpret them .... Further, the parties do not know
how their religious or moral view fares in their society,
whether, for example, it is in the majority or the minority ....
[E)qualliberty of conscience is the only principle that the persons in the original position can acknowledge. They cannot
take chances with their liberty by permitting the dominant religious or moral doctrine to persecute or to suppress others if
10. Since I want to keep the focus squarely on toleration. I am going to take no position on the relative merits of the Kantian and utilitarian defenses, especially since the
moral and political philosophy of the last 200 years has made no meaningful progress on
this issue.
II. JOHN RAWLS. A THEORY OF JUSTICE 214 (1971) (hereinafter. RAWLS.
JUSTICE].
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it wishes. Even granting ... that it is more probable than not
that one will turn out to belong to the majority (if a majority
exists), to gamble in this way would show that one did not
take one's religious or moral convictions seriously, or highly
12
value the liberty to examine one's beliefs.

Notice that nothing in this argument is specific to religion: the
argument, as Rawls says quite clearly, is on behalf of rights securing "liberty of conscience," which can include, of course, matters of conscience that are distinctively religious in character, but
13
are not limited to them.
The utilitarian arguments have a similar feature, namely,
that they do not obviously single out religion for special consideration as opposed to other important matters of conscience.
These arguments come in many different varieties, but all share,
in one form or the other, the core idea that it maximizes human
well-being-however exactly that is to be understood-to pro14
tect liberty of conscience against infringement by the state.
Why does it promote human well-being to protect liberty of
conscience? Many of the arguments trade, at bottom, on a simple idea: namely, that being able to choose what to believe and
how to live (within certain side-constraints, about which more
shortly) makes for a better life. Being told what you must believe
and how you must live, conversely, makes lives worse. I shall
gloss this simple thought as the "Private Space Argument." It
maximizes human well-being, so the argument goes, if, within
certain limits, individuals have a "private space" in which they
can freely choose what to believe and how to live.
12. /d. at 206--07.
13. I am going to ignore in this essay the later revision of Rawls's views. marked by
JOHN RAWLS. POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993 ). since its concerns are inapposite for the
principled argument here. In this later work. Rawls comes to the view that (as Freeman
puts it) "any traditional moral conception (justice as fairness [i.e .. the conception of A
Theory of Justice] included) is not feasible so far as it aspires to be the public grounding
of substantive moral and political principles ... Samuel Freeman. The Burdens of Public
Justification: Constructivism, Contractualism, and Publicitv. 6 POL.. PHIL. & ECON. 5. 9
(2007). The moral theory of A Theory of Justice is now t~eated as another "comprehensive" doctrine that might be reasonably rejected by the members of a pluralistic society
that liberalism aims to govern. and so fails by the standards of reasonable "public justification" such a society demands. But how could a theory of justice function as a merely
"political" theory. one stripped of its controversial moral. metaphysical. and epistemological doctrines? I am sympathetic to those who do not think this works and that. in particular. its account of "reasonableness" is woefully undertheorized. See. e.g .. GERALD
GAUS. JUSTIFICATORY LIBERALISM: AN ESSAY ON EPISTEMOLOGY AND POLITICAL
THEORY (1996). for one trenchant critique.
14. A good recent example is TIMOTHY MACKLEM. INDEPENDENCE OF MIND 11954 (2006).
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Is it true that granting individuals a "private space" maximizes human well-being? Could it be that many, perhaps even
most, individuals make themselves miserable, i.e., worse-off,
precisely because they make foolish choices about what to believe and how to live--or perhaps because they don't make real
choices at all, being hostage to social and economic milieu and
enjoying only the illusion of choice? These illiberal thoughtsfamiliar to readers of Plato, Marx, and Marcuse, among many
others-have little purchase these days within the mainstream of
English-speaking moral and political theory, though not, as far
as I can tell, because they have been refuted systematically. 15 For
the sake of argument here, I shall put these doubts to one side
and grant that the Private Space Argument is plausible, and thus
states a utilitarian ground for toleration.
In contrast to the moral arguments for toleration which we
have just considered, epistemic arguments for toleration emphasize the contribution that tolerance makes to knowledge. Such
arguments find their most systematic articulation in the work of
John Stuart Mill. According to Mill, toleration is necessary because (1) discovering the truth (or believing what is true in the
right kind of way) contributes to overall utility; and (2) we can
only discover the truth (or believe what is true in the right way)
in circumstances where different beliefs and practices are permitted to flourish. 16 The first premise in the Millian argument for
toleration is, quite obviously, a moral one: we should care about
the truth (or believing the truth in the right kind of way) because
of the contribution that makes to the morally valuable end of
utility. Nietzsche, among others, denies the moral premise: the
17
"truth is terrible," says Nietzsche, by which he means precisely
that sometimes knowing the truth is incompatible with life, a fortiori, with utility (though utility was not, of course, Nietzsche's
particular concern).
It is only the second premise of the Millian argument for
toleration that is distinctively epistemic: for it is this premise that
claims that toleration of divergent beliefs and practices contributes to knowledge of the truth. Note that the "truths" at issue for

15. Michael Rosen's critique of Marx's thesis about false consciousness is an exception. See MICHAEL ROSEN, ON VOLUNTARY SERVITUDE: FALSE CONSCIOUSNESS AND
THE THEORY OF IDEOLOGY (1996). I do not think that critique is successful. See Brian
Leiter, The Hermeneutics of Suspicion: Recovering Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud, in THE
FUTURE FOR PHILOSOPHY 74, 84--87 (Brian Leiter ed., 2004).
16. MILL, supra note 6, at 15-72
17. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ECCE HOMO 326 (W. Kaufmann trans., Vintage 1967).
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Mill concern both truths about "facts" as well as truths about
"value" -in particular, moral truths about the best kinds of lives
available to creatures like us. From an epistemic point of view,
both factual and moral truths have several features in common.
First, in neither case are we justified in assuming that we are infallible: we may be wrong, and that is a reason to permit dissident opinions, which may well be true. Second, even to the extent our beliefs are partially true, we are more likely to
appreciate the whole truth to the extent we are exposed to different beliefs which, themselves, may capture other parts of the
truth. Third, and finally, even to the extent our present beliefs
are wholly true, we are more likely to hold them for the right
kinds of reasons, and thus more reliably, to the extent we must
confront other opinions, even those that are false. For all these
epistemic reasons, toleration of a wide array of expression of differing beliefs is warranted according to Mill.
Moral truths, however-that is, truths about how we ought
to live-supply the ground for a wider scope of toleration, one
that encompasses practices, not just beliefs. For the epistemic
conditions for the discovery of moral truths require not only that
we be exposed to differing beliefs, but that, as Mill puts it, "the
worth of different modes of life should be proved practically"
through what Mill calls "experiments of living. " 1R In other words,
to know how we really ought to live, it is not enough to hear differing opinions expressed on the subject; one must have the empirical evidence provided by lives actually lived in accordance
with different guiding principles. It is only, for example, by seeing (or, better yet, experiencing) the lives of a pig satisfied and
Socrates dissatisfied (in Mill's famous example) that we can
come to the knowledge that the latter life is better, i.e., involves
higher quality pleasures, than the former.
Before we turn to the special case of religious toleration, we
need to call attention to one more feature of principled arguments for toleration: namely, that they all recognize side19
constraints on the scope of toleration. Even if there is a right to
liberty of conscience which demands state tolerance of differing
beliefs and practices, as Rawls holds; or even if toleration promotes overall utility or happiness-or facilitates a kind of
knowledge which promotes overall utility-as the utilitarian ar-

18. MILL. supra note 6. at 54.
19. An early conversation with Ross Harrison was helpful in clarifying my thinking
on this topic.

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

10

[Vol. 25:1

guments hold: it is still the case that there are limits on how
much toleration is demanded.
For the Rawlsian, ''The limitation of liberty is justified only
when it is necessary for liberty itself, to prevent an invasion of
freedom that would be still worse," 20 so "liberty of conscience is
to be limited only when there is a reasonable expectation that
not doing so will damage the public order which the government
21
should maintain." "This expectation," he adds, "must be based
on evidence and ways of reasoning acceptable to all." 22 For the
utilitarian, by contrast, the side-constraints on toleration are
typically set by some version of Mill's famous Harm Principle,
according to which "the only purpose for which power can be
rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community,
against his will, is to prevent harm to others. " 23
On either theoretical approach, the limits of tolerance are
set by the liberty interests or well-being of others in the community, and these limits have their primary impact not on toleration
of beliefs but on toleration of the practices or actions undertaken
in accord with those beliefs. The state will still, on either the
Rawlsian or Millian view, it seems, have to tolerate some religious group's belief that adherents of all other religions are heretics, destined for damnation; but the state need not tolerate that
same group's desire to act on its beliefs, by, for example, killing
the infant children of the alleged heretics before their souls are
corrupted, and thus eternally damned, by heresy.
Cases like these are, of course, the easy cases on any view of
toleration and its limits. Much harder are two other kinds of
cases: first, those involving the expression of beliefs that have as
their probable (but not certain) consequence actions that infringe upon liberty or are otherwise likely to cause prohibited
harms; and second, those involving practices or actions that have
as their probable (but not certain) consequence the infringement
of liberty or the causing of prohibited harms.
Mill is, of course, thinking of the first category of cases
when he writes that,
[E]ven opinions lose their immunity when the circumstances
in which they are expressed are such as to constitute their expression a positive instigation to some mischievous [i.e., harm20.
21.
22.
23.

RAWLS. JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 215.
/d. at 213.
/d.
MILL. supra note 6. at 9.
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ful] act. An opinion that corn dealers are starvers of the poor,
or that private property is robbery, ought to be unmolested
when simply circulated through the press, but may justly incur
punishment when delivered orally to an excited mob assem24
bled before the house of a corn dealer ....

That same thought is codified in American constitutional law by
the doctrine that speech which poses a "clear and present dan25
ger" can be suppressed by the state. This approach supposes
that you can hold and express any belief unless there is a "tight"
causal nexus between expression of the belief and forbidden
acts. The Rawlsian view seems to come to the same thing,
though the metaphors Rawls employs are different: the threat to
liberty, he says, for example, "must be securely established by
common experience." 26 The Rawlsian formulation does not as
obviously incorporate a requirement that the resultant harm be
as immediate or imminent as do the Millian examples or the
American constitutional doctrine. It suffices on the Rawlsian
view that the causal nexus between expression of belief and liberty-infringing act be "securely established." To be sure, the criteria for securely establishing that nexus may only be satisfied in
the same cases of immediate or imminent harmful conduct contemplated on the Millian view, which is reason to think they
come to the same thing.
The second category of cases presents the same issue: that
is, there are practices based on beliefs which it seems ought to be
tolerated (on either the Millian or Rawlsian view) about which
we can ask whether those practices might stand in a causal nexus
with harm that satisfies the applicable evidential standards. The
27
recent Canadian case involving the right of Sikhs to carry the
kirpan (a ceremonial knife), as required by their religion, even in
schools, illustrates this issue. Those opposing the practice argued, in part, that this religious practice poses too great a risk of
harm, reflected on the general ban of weapons in school; the
other side argued, by contrast, that the probability of harm was
very slight, as evidenced, for example, by the fact that there was
no known instance of a kirpan being used as a weapon. The
24. !d. at 53.
25. The "'clear and present danger"' test comes from the U.S. Supreme Court opinion in Schenck v. U.S. 249 U.S. 47. 52 (1919). It has been replaced. as a matter of doctrinal formulation. by the idea of "'imminent lawless action"' in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444.447 (1969).
26. RAWLS. JUSTICE. supra note 11. at 215.
27. Multani v. Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys. [2006] 1 S.C.R. 256.
2006 SCC 6 (Can.).
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Court, of course, opted for toleration of the practice of carrying
the kirpan, given the importance of the practice to the believers,
the putatively slight risk of harm, and the special value multiculturalism is assigned in the Canadian Charter.
III. IS RELIGION SPECIAL FROM THE STANDPOINT
OF PRINCIPLED TOLERATION?
In asking whether there is something special about religion
that bears on religious toleration, we are not asking whether
there is some feature (or features) of religious belief that warrant principled toleration of religion on either moral or epistemic
grounds. There plainly are such features, for example, that religious beliefs are often matters of conscience, and thus would fall
within the scope of any argument, like the Rawlsian one, for protecting liberty of conscience. If there is a special reason to tolerate religion it has to be because there are features of religion
which warrant toleration and these features are either: 28
1. Features that all and only religious beliefs have, either as a matter of (conceptual or other) necessity or
as a contingent matter of fact; or
2. Features which other beliefs have, or might have, but
which in these other cases possession of the features
would not warrant principled toleration. 29
I am hard-pressed to think of features of religion that satisfy
the second category, so I shall put that possibility to one side
here. Are there, then, features of religious belief that, either
necessarily or simply contingently, distinguish religious beliefs
from other kinds of belief that might warrant toleration?
The general question of what distinguishes "religion" has
been extensively discussed in the constitutional literature,
though often with an eye to purely doctrinal questions about the
meaning of a particular constitutional provision within a particu28. This formulation owes much to David Kill oren.
29. There is a variant on this possibility, namely, features which are not unique to
religious belief. but which are nonetheless more salient. or more urgent, when annexed to
religious beliefs than when not. We need not go so far as to say that when not annexed to
religion they don't warrant principled toleration at all. It might be enough that the case
for toleration is strongest in the case of religion. Again, as with (2), in the text, I am not
sure what those features might be. (Thanks to Les Green for clarification on this point.)
Brian Kierland also points out to me, correctly. that what is really at issue here are
svstems of religious belief, not necessarily individual beliefs. For ease of discussion. I will
r~fer to beliefs simpliciter, but I don't think the failure to spell out the notion of system.
and membership in the system, will be significant for what follows.
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lar constitutional tradition and socio-political context.") Being
concerned with questions of statutory or constitutional meaning.
these approaches do not necessarily grapple with what makes religion morally or epistemically distinctive from the standpoint of
principled toleration. The inquiry here is to figure out what is
distinctive about religion such that religion ought to be tolerated,
quite apart from any particular legal regime. An answer to that
question will permit us then to return to actual constitutional
protections to see whether they are justifiable from a principled
point of view.
The legal philosopher Timothy Macklem is unusual in having addressed our question directly in a 2000 article on "Faith as
a Secular Value" in the McGill Law Journat and in his recent
book on the philosophical foundations of the individual liberties.32 According to Macklem, what distinguishes religious belief
is that it is based on faith, not reasons. As he puts it:
[F]aith itself provides the moral basis for freedom of religion .... At its most basic level, the concept of faith describes
the manner in which a particular belief or set of beliefs may
be subscribed to by human beings. In that sense of the word,
faith exists as a form of rival to reason. When we say that we
believe in something as a matter of faith . . . we express a
commitment to that which cannot be established by reason, or

30. See, e.g., Abner Greene. The Political Balance of the Religion Clauses. 102
YALE LJ. 1611 (1993). which treats an extrahuman source of normative authority as distinctive of religion and thus as doing justice to the understanding of religion in the
American context. Andrew Koppelman rejects Greene's view for its tethering of religion
to theism. proposing instead that religion includes "all belief systems that make ultimate
claims about the meaning of human existence." Andrew Koppelman. Secular Purpose, 88
VA. L. REV. 87, 135 (2002). This is rather obviously over-inclusive. as Koppelman effectively concedes when subsuming Nietzsche's philosophy under the rubric of religion so
defined (id. at 131)-and, of course, it would not only be Nietzsche's philosophy that
would turn out to be a "religion" on this view. Some other writers (in different forms,
Justices Scalia and Thomas. as well as John Finnis and Michael McConnell) contend that
religion should be singled out for legal solicitude because it is "good." for society or for
the believer or perhaps both. (In a sense. Timothy Macklem's argument [discussed. below. in the text] is a more sophisticated version of this position.) But that. of course. begs
the question of what religion is. and the answers these writers offer turn out to be overand under-inclusive in rather obvious ways. See. e.g .. Koppelman's criticism of Finnis on
this score. /d. at 130.
Many other writers seem attracted to Kent Greenawalt's view that we should eschew
definitions of religion. in favor of looking at "indisputable instances" and then arguing by
analogy to other cases, even when all the cases taken together do not share common features. See Kent Greenawalt. Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 CAL L.
REV. 753.763 (1984). The problem with this kind of approach from a moral point of view
is well-discussed by Macklem. MACKLEM. supra note 14, at 120-26.
31. Timothy Macklem. Faith as a Secular Value. 45 MCGILL L.J. 1 (2000).
32. MACKLEM. supra note 14.
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to that 33which can be established by reason but not for that
reason.

According to Macklem, faith is required "[w]here the quest for
reasons is impossible, but commitment [even without reasons] is
34
potentially valuable" and so, even from a secular perspective,
we have reason to value faith and tolerate it. 35
Remarks by a prolific American scholar of law and religion,
John Witte, Jr., suggest a second important feature of religion
for purposes of our question. Professor Witte sounds familiar
themes when he writes:
[R ]eligion is special and is accorded special protection in the
[American] Constitution .... The founders' vision was that religion is more than simply a peculiar form of speech and assembly, privacy and autonomy. Religion is a unique source of
individual and personal identity, involving "duties that we
owe to our Creator, and the manner of discharging them," as
Madison put it. Religion is also a unique form of public and
social identity, involving a vast plurality of sanctuaries,
schools, charities, missions, and other forms and forums of
faith._ll,

Although these themes are familiar, most of them seem to me to
be clearly false, at least in the world today. Religion is not "a
unique source of individual and personal identity"; the hundreds
of millions of people who have no religious beliefs presumably
still have individual and personal identities, defined by sundry
other systems of belief- moral, cultural, ethnic, professional,
and so on. It also seems dubious that religion is "a unique form
of public and social identity" as purportedly evidenced by the institutions that operate in the name of religion. Politics, class,
ethnicity, cultural traditions, and so on all seem to play the same
kind of role, in some instances, much more powerfully than religion does (think of France or England). Where Witte is on to
something important, I think, is in calling attention to the religious idea of ''duties that we owe to our Creator, and the manner of discharging them." Many religious commands have a kind
of normativity, a kind of motivational force for persons-

33.
34.
35.
36.

!d. at 133.
/d. at 137-38.
/d. at 138-41.

JOHN WITTE. JR..
EXPERIMENT 232 (2000).
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perhaps, but not necessarily, in virtue of their being "owed to [a]
Creator"- that may, indeed, distinguish them in important ways.
Following the leads of Macklem and Witte, we might suggest that two features single out "religious" states of mind from
others. The first pertains to the normativity of (at least some) religious commands; the second pertains to the relationship between religious belief and evidence. On the proposed account,
what distinguishes religious belief from other kinds of beliefs is
that:
(1) Religious belief issues in categorical demands on action, that is, demands that must be satisfied, no matter what an individual's antecedent desires and no
matter what incentives or disincentives the world off ers up; 37 an d ,
(2) Religious beliefs do not answer ultimately (or at the
limit) to evidence and reasons, as evidence and reasons are understood in other domains concerned
with knowledge of the world. Religious beliefs, in
virtue of being based on "faith," are insulated from
ordinary standards of evidence and rational justification, the ones we employ in both common-sense and
in science. 3H
37. The claim is not that all beliefs commonly denominated ··religious" issue in such
commands. but that it is characteristic of religion that at least some of the commands in
which it issues are categorical in character. It may be more accurate. though. to say that
religious belief issues in as-if categorical demands on action. since it is familiar enough
that religions can impose other-worldly incentives to produce action in this world that
seems "as if' it were a response to a categorical reason. when it is really a response to an
instrumental reason for achieving an other-worldly objective. As Adrienne Martin aptly
put it to me in correspondence: "an instrumental reason motivates as strongly as the incentive on which it is contingent." and other-worldly incentives can. of course. provide a
very powerful instrumental reason! Indeed. as I note later on. to the extent that a metaphysics of ultimate reality is also a distinguishing feature of religion. it may supply believers with instrumental reasons for acting insofar as acting in the right kinds of way enables
believers to stand in the right kind of relationship to that ultimate reality.
38. Religious beliefs presumably do answer to evidence in instrumental contexts.
that is. when there are questions about what means would be effective to the realization
of the categorical commands of the religion. So. too. one suspects that the interpretation
of categorical commands is causally influenced by the experiences of the interpreters: so.
e.g .. "liberation theology" arose as a strand of Catholicism in the context of the horrific
poverty and vicious oppression that characterized U.S. client states in Latin America after World War II. But this phenomenon trades on an ambiguity between "evidence" as
justification for the proposition it supports and "evidence .. as the experiences which explain why particular propositions are embraced. An adequate socio-historical explanation of liberation theology must. of course. make reference to the climate of social and
economic oppression in which it arose: but the beliefs constitutive of that religious autook were not. themselves. presented as justified by those experiences. (Thanks ~to Sheila
Sokolowski for raising this issue.)
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I shall refer to this first feature as the categoricity of religious
commands and the second as religious belief's insulation from
evidence. The categoricity of religious commands accounts for
both one of the most admirable and one of the most frightening
aspects of religious commitment, namely, the willingness of religiously motivated believers to act in accordance with religious
precepts, notwithstanding the costs. Thus we find the devoutly
religious among those who were at the forefront of domestic resistance to Nazi oppression in the 1930s,39 and the injustice of
apartheid in South Africa from the 1960s onward and in America in the 1950s and 1960s. 40 We also, of course, find the devoutly
religious among those who bomb abortion clinics and fly airplanes into buildings. These religiously inspired individuals risk
(and often suffer) death, injury, and prison in order to comply
with their religious conscience. It is painfully familiar, of course,
that in all these cases adherents of the very same religion contested whether the actions of these believers were sanctioned, let
alone commanded, by the religious doctrine. (Religious leaders,
to take but one example, were also at the forefront of defense of
apartheid in the U.S. in the 1950s and 60s.) The important fact
here, however, is that religious commands-whether rightly or
wrongly understood-are taken categorically by their adherents.
Is religion really alone in this regard? One respect in which
Marxism may have been rightly called a "religion" is precisely
that in some of the historical contexts just noted, the only other
groups as categorically committed to resistance as the religiously
inspired were Communists, who led resistance to Nazism, as well
as apartheid in both South Africa and the U.S., long before other
groups joined the battle. More generally, of course, one might
think that all commands of morality are categorical in just this
way. Does that mean, then, that religion is not special after all,
since it shares the property of categoricity of its commands with
Marxism and with one common understanding of morality?
41
We can easily distinguish the case of moral commands. To
be sure, there are theoretical understandings of moralityKant's most famously, though not only his-according to which

39. See. e.g .. MARY ALICE GALLIN. ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS FACTORS IN THE
GERMAN RESISTANCE TO HITLER 165-97 (1955).
40. See, e.g., JOHN W. DE GRUCHY. THE CHURCH STRUGGLE IN SOUTH AFRICA
(2d ed .. 1986); DAVID L. CHAPPELL, A STONE OF HOPE: PROPHETIC RELIGION AND
THE DEATH OF JIM CROW 87-104 (2004).
41. We shall. however, return to a further complication about the moral case. below.
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the demands of morality are indeed categorical. What is interesting and important about religion is that it is one of the few systems of belief that gives effect to this categoricity. Pure Kantian
moral agents are few and far between (I think I can count them
on one hand, and probably have fingers left over!), but those
who genuinely conduct their lives in accord with the categoricity
of the moral demands they recognize are overwhelmingly religwus.
But not all of them are, of course, and this is where the case
of Marxists and other similar "believers" become relevant. Here,
though, we need to attend to the second purportedly distinctive
feature of religious belief, namely, its insulation from evidence
and reasons. Whatever the historical and philosophical verdict
on the evidence and reasons supporting Marxism, one very clear
difference is that Marxism took itself to be answering to-not insulated from- standards of evidence and reasons in the sciences,
in a way that religion has not. 42 Marx, as is well-known, conceived of his theory as a ''scientific" account of historical change,
and thus it had to answer to the same standards of evidence and
justification as any other scientific theory. (That is why it has
been possible to refute historical materialism by counterexample.4') Nothing similar, of course, is true of any of the major
religious traditions: all countenance at least some central beliefs
which are not ultimately answerable to evidence and reasons as
these are understood elsewhere (e.g., in common sense, and in
science). This is why Professor Macklem was correct to emphasize that the distinctively religious state of mind is that of faith,
that is, believing something notwithstanding the evidence and
reasons that fail to support it or even contradict it.
Even here, of course. we need to be careful. There are, for
example. "intellectualist" traditions in religious thought- Paley's
"natural theology" or neo-Thomist arguments come to mindaccording to which religious beliefs (for example, belief in a
Creator or, as in America recently, belief in "an Intelligent De42. I think this is true notwithstanding the unhappy strand of Marxist thought that
took seriously the Hegelian idea that ''dialectical reason" was a special kind of reason. as
opposed to a metaphysical dogma. For even the idea of "dialectical reason" took seriously the idea of evidence and rational justification. and. in fact. Hegel's entire philosophical career was an exercise in providing evidence for the purportedlv dialectical structure of ideological. and thus historical. evolution. That the Hegeiian influence on
Marxism produced a false picture of evidence and reasons does not alter the fact that
Marxism took itself to have an obligation to answer to standards of rational justification.
43. See. e.g.. Joshua Cohen. Book Note. 79 J. PHIL. 253. 266--D8 (1982) (reviewing
G.A. COHEN. KARL MARX'S THEORY OF HISTORY: A DEFENCE (1978)).
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signer") are, in fact, supported by the kinds of evidence adduced
in the sciences, once that evidence is rightly interpreted. It is
doubtful whether these intellectualist traditions capture the
character of popular religious belief, but even if they did, there
remain important senses in which they are still "insulated from
evidence." First, of course, it is dubious (to the put matter gently)
that these positions are really serious about following the evidence where it leads, as opposed to manipulating it to fit preordained ends. Second, and relatedly, in the case of the sciences,
beliefs based on evidence are also revisable in light of the evidence; but in the intellectualist traditions in religious thought
just noted, there is no suggestion that the fundamental beliefs
will be revisable in light of new evidence. Religious beliefs are
purportedly supported by evidence, but they are still insulated
44
from revision in light of evidence.
Yet there is a different kind of case- pertaining not to the
under-inclusiveness of the characterization but rather its overinclusiveness-that might raise doubts about whether categoricity of commands and insulation from evidence are distinctive features of religious belief and practice. Think, for example, of the
Maoist personality cult that gripped China during the "cultural
45
revolution" in the 1960s. Here masses of individuals acted on
commands from Chairman Mao which they took to be, in effect,
"categorical," and which they carried out without regard to evidence, including evidence of the substantial harms inflicted on
individuals and, ultimately, society as a whole (though arguably
evidence of these latter harms was less apparent at the time).
Does this make the Maoist personality cult a religion? Perhaps
we should so describe it, yet this seems to run roughshod over
distinctions it seems worth drawing. Pre-theoretically, after all,
we might think totalitarian personality cults are distinct from religions, even if in some historical and cultural contexts their nature and effects are the same. But what marks the difference,
given that it is not the categorical character of their commands or
the insulation of their core beliefs from evidence? One plausible
idea is that religious beliefs not only involve categorical commands and insulation from evidence, but also:
44. It might be said (as Kenneth Himma pointed out to me) that religious beliefs
are .. in principle'" revisable: if God thundered from the sky that Heaven and Hell do not
exist. it might be supposed that this would. in fact. change the minds of some number of
religious believers. But .. in principle" responsiveness to a kind of evidence that is never
in the offing seems indistinguishable in practice from insulation from evidence. simpliciter.
45. See. e.g.. TAl SUNG AN. MAO TSE-TuNG'S CULTURAL REVOLUTION (1972).
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(3) Religious beliefs involve, explicitly or implicitly, a
metaphysics of ultimate reality.
But what is it to endorse a "metaphysics of ultimate realit:r"? A metaphysics of an ultimate reality seems to be distinguished, in part, by the relationship in which it stands to the empirical evidence of the sciences: namely. that such a view about
the "essence" or "ultimate nature" of things neither claims support from empirical evidence, nor purports to be constrained by
empirical evidence (its claims "transcend" the empirical evidence, hence its '·metaphysical" character). In this regard,
though, (3) seems to be only a variation on the idea that religious belief is insulated from evidence- "insulated'' not only in
the sense that it does not answer to empirical evidence, but also
in the sense that it does not even aspire to answer to such evidence.
The latter point may capture the metaphysical character of
the beliefs, but it is still silent on the sense in which they concern
ultimate reality. "Ultimate" in this context has less to do. I think,
with metaphysical gradations of what is essential (whatever that
would mean) than it does with questions of value: the "ultimate"
reality is the aspect of reality that is most important for valuable/worthwhile/desirable human lives, whether that concerns
the transcendent well-being of the "soul," or the moral value of
life in this, the material world. The categoricity of commands distinctive of religious beliefs are. in turn, related to this metaphysics of ultimate reality in the sense that they specify what must be
done in order for believers to stand in the right kinds of relations
to "ultimate reality.'' i.e .. to the reality that makes their lives
4
worthwhile and meaningful. "
Will the addition of a third distinctive characteristic of religious belief rule out personality cults of the Maoist variety?
There is some reason to think so. First, the Maoist-style personality cults may ordinarily be de facto insulated from evidence,
but they are less often de jure insulated: that is, they purport to
answer to facts and evidence, in a way that "metaphysical"
claims about "ultimate" reality do not even purport to do so. 47
Second, the personality cults, focused as they are on the personality of the leader. have an only indirect connection to the nature
46. In this sense. the as-if categorical reasons mav reallv be instrumental ones. See
discussion supra note 37.
·
·
47. So. e.g .. Mao thought forcing educated professionals to labor in the fields was
an instrumentally rational approach to promoting the egalitarian values on which the
communist revolution was based.
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of ultimate reality, one contingent on the extent to which the
"leader" is interested in those kinds of questions. To the extent a
personality cult is de jure insulated from evidence and the "dear
leader's" commands are directly related to his view of ultimate
reality, then to that extent we may need to revise the pretheoretical intuition (if we share it) that personality cults are different from religious beliefs.
Although a metaphysics of ultimate reality may be the third
essential feature that distinguishes religious belief from the beliefs held by participants in personality cults, for purposes of the
question of whether there is a principled reason for toleration of
religion qua religion, only the first two features. I will argue,
matter. This is because the second feature. insulation from evidence (especially de jure insulation from evidence), already captures what is significant: namely, the metaphysical character of
religious beliefs about "ultimate reality." By contrast, so many
different systems of belief involve views about "ultimate reality" -and such views almost all qualify for toleration under the
rubric of "conscience" (subject, of course, to the usual sideconstraints)- that the fact that religious beliefs also involve such
views won't generate any special reason for toleration that does
not attach in virtue of the first two distinctive features of religious belief.
This leaves us, then, with a final possible (and perhaps the
most worrisome) case of over-inclusiveness in the proposed account of "religion," namely morality itself. For is not morality
characterized both by categoricity of its commands and its insulation from reasons and evidence (as reasons and evidence are
understood, e.g., in the sciences)? Now as noted earlier, categoricity is not necessarily a feature of morality, though it is, to be
sure, central on many theoretical understandings; and religion,
as we also observed earlier, may make categoricity socially effective in a way that it would not otherwise be. But what of "insulation from reasons and evidence"? What we say about morality
on this score will depend on what we take to be the relevant
metaphysics and semantics of morality. For cognitivist realists
like Richard Boyd and Peter Railton,48 for example, moral judgments are not insulated from reasons and evidence as they are
49
understood in the sciences-indeed, just the opposite. So on
48. See, e.g., Richard Boyd. How to Be a Moral Realist, in ESSAYS ON MORAL
REALISM 181 (G. Sayre-McCord ed .. 1988): PETER RAILTON. FACTS. VALUES, AND
NORMS (2003).
49. If one takes views like John McDowell's to be instances of cognitivist realism,
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this view, morality is not at all like religion: it answers to reasons
and evidence-and answers successfully! Non-cognitivist antirealists, by contrast, conceive of moral judgments not as expressing beliefs (which might be true or false) but rather as expressing
mental states that are not truth-apt, i.e., are by their nature insulated from reasons and evidence. 50 Religious judgments are still
different, on this account, since some religious judgments do express beliefs and so, in principle, could be answerable to reasons
and evidence, but are held to be insulated from them. So on either of the main contenders for a credible metaphysics and semantics of morality, morality is still different from religion.
If. then, the categoricity of its commands and its insulation
from evidence (not just de facto, but also de jure) are the distinctive features of religious belief- not, to be clear, the features
that make religious beliefs important and meaningful to people,
but rather the features that distinguish religious beliefs from
other equally important and meaningful beliefs-do the principled reasons for tolerance reviewed earlier warrant singling religion out for protection? 5 ' It is to this question that we now turn.
IV. WHY TOLERATE RELIGION?
We considered, earlier, three categories of principled arguments for toleration: two kinds of moral arguments, one deontological (illustrated by Rawls), and one utilitarian; and an episthen the issue is trickier: but I do not think views like McDowell's are viable accounts of
the objectivity of morality. for reasons discussed in Brian Leiter. Objectivity, Morality,
and Adjudication (2001). reprinted in NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS ON
AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND NATURALISM IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 225 (2007). I
shall. in any case. bracket them here.
50. Moral judgments. to be sure. may still be influenced by evidence, insofar as the
attitudes expressed presuppose factual claims that answer to evidence.
51. In the American constitutional literature. another proposal has recently attracted attention. though it suffers. in my view. from an even more extreme problem of
over-inclusiveness than the proposal considered in the text. On this view-defended,
most prominently. in Christopher Eisgruber & Lawrence Sager, The Vulnerability of
Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct. 61 U. CHI. L. REV.
1245 (1994). and in CHRISTOPHER EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE SAGER. RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION 1 (2007)-religious belief demands special protection because it is supposed to be especially vulnerable to discriminatory treatment. But
special vulnerability to discriminatory treatment can hardly mark out "religious belief" as
a category of human belief (and concomitant practices) warranting special protections.
Race and physical disability, to take two obvious cases, make individuals vulnerable to
discriminatory treatment. probably more often than religious belief and practice: but
even if we confine our attention to beliefs, there is ample evidence, in terms of legal sanctions and state persecution. that believing in abolitionism. or anarchism, or Communism
at various points in American history made one at least as vulnerable to discrimination as
believing in a particular religion.
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temic argument, exemplified by Mill. If I am right about the features that distinguish religious belief, is there any reason to think
that principled toleration demands tolerance of those beliefs in
particular?
I am going to bracket here the Rawlsian moral argument for
toleration, because I can not see how persons in Rawls's original
position, operating behind the "veil of ignorance," could reason,
in particular, about the value of insulation from evidence and the
categoricity of demands. To be sure, Rawls allows that those in
the original position do know that they will recognize categorical
demands, though they do not, of course, know what those will
be. As Rawls writes: "An individual recognizing religious and
moral obligations regards them as binding absolutely in the
sense that he cannot qualify his fulfillment of them for the sake
of greater means for promoting his other interests." 52 But this
grounds, in Rawls's view, the argument for the general principle
of equal liberty of conscience- individuals in the original position "cannot take chances with their liberty"" as he says-not
anything specific to religion. Indeed, Rawls repeatedly lumps religious and moral categoricity together, so that it is fair to say
that the only thing individuals behind the veil of ignorance know
is that they will accept some categorical demands, not they will
accept distinctively religious ones, that is, ones whose grounding
54
is a matter of faith. If that is right, then the Rawlsian perspective can not help us evaluate the principled case for toleration of
religion qua religion.
It may also seem that we can dispense with the epistemic arguments for toleration equally quickly. There is no reason to
think, after all, that tolerating the expression of beliefs that are
insulated from evidence and reasons-that is, insulated from
epistemically relevant considerations-will promote knowledge
of the truth. Bear in mind, though, that Mill is not concerned
only with knowing the truth, but believing what is true for the
right kinds of reasons. Perhaps exposure to opinions that are insulated from reasons and evidence is, itself, a spur to better rea52. RAWLS. JUSTICE. supra note 11. at 207.
53. /d.
54. There is a puzzle. tangential to my concerns here. suggested though by Rawls's
discussion. Individuals in the original position choose equal liberty of conscience because
thev can't .. gamble ... id. at 207. on the prospect that their own categorical religious comma~ds will be disfavored in the society in which they find themselves. Yet insofar as they
endorse equal liberty of conscience, they do have to gamble that their categorical religious commands will not be fundamentally illiberal ones. i.e .. ones that demand the extermination of heresy and the like.
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sons for believing what we ought to believe? That is certainly
possible, but it is hard to see why it is likely to be the case.
Yet this dismissal of the epistemic argument is too quick."
For only if we already suppose that the only epistemically relevant considerations are those having to do with evidence and
reasons as understood in both common-sense and the sciences
would we be entitled to conclude that beliefs insulated from
these kinds of considerations do not contribute to knowledge of
the truth. Indeed, it might seem to be precisely in the spirit of
Millian epistemic libertarianism to think that alternative epistemic methods (or methods that purport to have epistemic payoffs) be permitted in the interests of discovering new truths.
We must be cautious here, however, about the proper extension of the Millian view. For even Mill, recall, believed that
there was no epistemic reason for the "free market" of ideas and
arguments in the case of mathematics (geometry in particular):
"there is nothing at all to be said on the wrong side of the question [in the case of geometry]. The peculiarity of the evidence of
mathematical truths is that all the argument is on one side. "'h
This is all the more striking in light of the fact that Mill is a radical empiricist, and so denies that there is any a priori knowledge:
even logical and mathematical truths are a posteriori. vindicated
by inductive generalizations based on past experience. On the
Millian view, then, there simply would not be any epistemic case
for making room for, e.g., "mathematics based on faith,'' on the
grounds that new truths might be uncovered.
Might we not generalize the point? Because religious belief
is insulated from the standards of evidence and reasons that have
been vindicated a posteriori since the scientific revolution, one
might think that, as with mathematics, there is a Millian reason
to think that any wholesale departure from these epistemic standards is tantamount to a wholesale abandonment of epistemically relevant considerations. as my original formulation of the
7
"quick" response proposed originally.' Religious belief, on this
55.
56.

I am grateful to Adam Samaha for pressing this point.
MILL. supra note 6. at 34--35.
57. I take it Quine adopts a similar posture in W.V. QLJINE. PURSl!IT OF TRUTH
( 1990) when he says that. '"Even telepathy and clairvoyance are scientific options. however moribund. It would take some extraordinary evidence to enliven them. but. if that
were to happen. then empiricism itself ... would go by the board. For remember that
that norm ... are integral to science. and science is fallible and corrigible ... /d. at 20-21.
But. he then immediately adds. '"it is idle to bulwark definitions [e.g .. of science] against
implausible contingencies." such as evidence reviving telepathy as a scientific option. !d.
at 21.
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account, really is marked by its insulation from the only epistemically relevant considerations, the latter point (so it is
claimed) vindicated a posteriori as in the case of mathematics.
The claim about a posteriori vindication of certain epistemic
standards is, itself, a controversial one, and much will ultimately
turn on the details of what we take the historical record to show.
So perhaps there is a weaker, but still pertinent, response to the
challenge to what is supposed to count as epistemically relevant
considerations for purposes of the Millian epistemic argument
for toleration. For even if we allow that there is an epistemic
reason to tolerate purportedly epistemically relevant considerations different than those that figure in common-sense and the
sciences, there will now be nothing in this argument that singles
out religious "faith" for special solicitude, since it is only one of a
multiplicity of non-standard methods that purportedly provide
access to truths (consider telepathy, talking with the dead, clairvoyance, etc.). So even if there is a viable epistemic argument for
toleration of beliefs insulated from the familiar standards of evidence and reasons, that argument does not help single out religious belief for special protection.
Of course, on the Millian view, there is a second kind of
epistemic goal at issue-namely, knowing how one ought to
live-a kind of knowledge requiring "experiments in [different
kinds of] living." Perhaps, then, a different epistemic argument
for tolerance of religious beliefs in particular is that living in accord with categorical demands that are unhinged from reasons
and evidence is one of the "experiments" we ought to encourage
58
through a regime of toleration?
Toleration, however, operates under side-constraints, as we
noted earlier. Being a genocidal white supremacist, after all, is
an "experiment in living," but the Millian (or even the Rawlsian)
argument from toleration does not suppose that we ought to tolerate that experiment given the harm it can be reasonably expected to cause. And that brings us to the absolute crux of the
issue as to whether there is a special reason to tolerate religion
qua religion. If what distinguishes religious beliefs from other

58. Many, perhaps most, religious believers in the industrialized nations these days
embrace only a "softer" version of these kinds of beliefs: unhinged from evidence, yes,
but much more rarely categorical in their commands. If there are reasons for tolerating
these "experiments in living"- as there presumably are- it seems unlikely they are going
to be peculiar to this "softer" form of religious belief and practice, which is harder to distinguish from other exercises of conscience that figure in people's lives. The focus in the
text is on the core, distinctive case of religious belief.
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important and meaningful beliefs held by individuals is that religious beliefs are both insulated from evidence and issue in categorical demands on action, then isn't there reason to worry that
religious belief, as against other matters of conscience, are far
more likely to cause harms and infringe on liberty?
Now such a demeaning conclusion about religious belief
would certainly be congenial to many non-believers, but I wonder whether it is warranted. It is true that the combination of
categorical demands on action and indifference to evidence seems
a frightening one, as it can often be, but is there any reason to
think that attention to evidence precludes embrace of abhorrent
categorical demands? Or, to put the point differently: why think
the evidence would thwart grossly unjust categorical demands?
This raises vexed philosophical questions-for example,
does knowledge of the facts require certain moral responses,
such that people sensitive to the evidence would not be capable
of the atrocities so commonly perpetrated by religious zealots?but we may bracket those here. For from the standpoint of a
principled argument for toleration, the question is slightly different. The question is not whether toleration of categorical demands on action conjoined with indifference to evidence stands in
the requisite causal nexus with harm or infringements of liberty
such that we would be justified in not tolerating those kinds of
beliefs. Rather, the question is whether there is any special reason to tolerate beliefs whose distinctive character is defined by
the categoricity of its demands conjoined with its insulation from
evidence? That is, we are still looking for a principled argument
for tolerating religion qua religion; only if we found such an argument, would we then have to address the question about the
limits of that principle of toleration by reference to sideconstraints. If it is true that beliefs that support categorical demands which are insulated from evidence have a special potential
for harms to well-being, then that would be reason to doubt
whether any utilitarian argument for tolerating religion qua religion will succeed.
The worry, baldly stated then, comes to this: there may be
compelling principled reasons for the state to respect liberty of
conscience, but there is no apparent moral reason why states
should carve out special protections that encourage individuals
to structure their lives around categorical demands that are insulated from the standards of evidence and reasoning we everywhere else expect to constitute constraints on judgment and action. Singling out religion for toleration is tantamount to
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thinking we ought to encourage precisely this conjunction of
categorical fervor based on epistemic indifference. And it is hard
to see what utilitarian rationale there could be for that. 59
Where does that conclusion leave us, then? First, it suggests
that there is no principled reason for legal or constitutional regimes to single out religion for protection; there is no moral or
epistemic consideration that favors special legal solicitude towards beliefs that conjoin categorical commands with insulation
from evidence. Second, the general principled arguments for toleration noted earlier, both the broadly Rawlsian and Millian
ones, do justify legal protection for liberty of conscience, which
would necessarily encompass toleration of religious beliefs.
Third, and perhaps most controversially, the general reasons for
being skeptical that there are special reasons to tolerate religion
qua religion (because of the special potential for harm that attaches to the conjunction of categorical demands based on beliefs
insulated from evidence) suggest that we must be especially alert
to the limits of religious toleration imposed by the sideconstraints.
How these theoretical conclusions about principled toleration should play out in the practical realm of legal regulation is a

59. It may be useful to consider the recent Canadian kirpan-in-the-schools case
(Multani. [2006]1 S.C.R. 256. 2006 SCC 6) in light of these points. Although the Canadian Supreme Court allowed that the kirpan "undeniably has characteristics of a bladed
weapon capable of wounding or killing a person" id. at para. 37; that many Sikhs "wear a
plastic or wooden kirpan" id. at para. 39, which does not present these risks: and that carrying kirpans is. properly. prohibited in courts and on airplanes, id. at paras. 62--M. the
Court nonetheless held that the student in question could carry the most dangerous kind
of kirpan as long as "his personal and subjective belief in the religious significance of the
kirpan is sincere" id. at para. 37. including his "sincere" belief that wearing a plastic or
wooden kirpan will not suffice-since adherents of a religion '"may adhere to the dogma
and practices of that religion to varying degrees of rigour'" id. at para. 39. apparently free
from scrutiny by the state.
The extent to which the state must defer to the "dogma" of a "sincere" believerwhose beliefs issue in categorical commands unhinged from evidence (hence their dogmatic character)-is perhaps most apparent in the Court's peculiar discussion of why the
school setting is different than courtrooms and airplanes. Although there are obvious
differences between these environments, the Court laid most emphasis on its romantic
view of schools as places where "both teachers and students are partners" rather than
adversaries. such that it is "possible to better control the different types of situations that
arise in schools." !d. at para. 65 (citing Pandori v. Peel Bd. of Education (1990), 12
C.H.R.R. D/364 at para. 197). Quite remarkably, no mention is made of the pertinent
differences that might count in favor of stricter restrictions in schools, such as: the absence of armed guards in many schools all of the time, and in all schools in at least some
places some of the time; the literal immaturity and concomitant problems with impulse
control characteristic of school populations; as well as the antagonistic relationships
among students. and between teachers and students, that surely exist as often as the romantic "partnerships" the Court envisions.
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complicated question that I plan to address in a separate paper.(,()
In the latter context, we will have to remain especially alert to
non-principled considerations, such as Schauer's worry about
"governmental incompetence," which may seem particularly
acute in this context, as they are in the context of free speech.
There may, indeed, be no moral or epistemic reason why the
state should give special consideration to private beliefs which
issue in categorical demands that are unhinged from reasons and
evidence. But as a practical matter, what reason is there to think
that government will correctly identify that class of beliefs? Sectarian bias and prejudice are surely likely to co-opt principled
61
arguments for unprincipled ends. It may turn out there is no
principled reason to tolerate religion qua religion, but there may
still be compelling practical reasons to think the alternatives are
worse.

60. It will be particularly important to distinguish questions about the accommodation of religious practices (for example. by exempting religious practitioners from generally applicable laws) from questions about the establishment (or state endorsement) of
religion. Accommodation arguments may find their grounding in very different considerations than those adduced here pertaining to religious toleration. So. e.g .. Martha
Nussbaum argues, plausibly enough. that "equal respect" considerations are likely to
demand substantial religious accommodation. given the ease with which "neutralitv"
considerations will favor the de facto dominant religious culture. See generally MARTHA
NUSSBAUM. LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE (2008).

61. That fact might be thought to lend support to the Eisgruber and Sager argument discussed earlier (supra note 51). But the question there was whether vulnerabilit1·
to discrimination was adequate to mark out religion as deserving special legal protectio~.
and the answer to that question is unaffected by the fact that religion. like so manv other
kinds of human beliefs and practices. may be susceptible to discrimination: what ~atters
for the point in the text is that religion is vulnerable to discrimination. not that it is especially or uniquely so vulnerable.

